Headline Series

American Interests in the Middle East

Harvey P. Hall
Carl Hermann Voss

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American Interests in the Middle East
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1. A Forgotten Region? 3
2. The United States in Middle Eastern Eyes 6
3. Soviet Expansion 15
4. Oil for War or Recovery 27
5. A Jewish State 39

Problems Facing Israel
Carl Hermann Voss 52

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American Interests In the Middle East

by Harvey P. Hall

1. A Forgotten Region?

The world's three principal trouble spots—Western Europe, China and the Middle East—lie on the borders of the Soviet Union, confronting the new Russian empire from east, west, and south. This geographical concentration of crisis areas around the U.S.S.R. is no accident; the puzzle of how to get along with Russia has come to dominate all other international considerations.

We Americans play our part in these three areas with considerable interest but varying degrees of perception. Europe we understand best. From Europe comes our cultural heritage. A fight for the survival of Western European culture is a fight for the survival of our own culture—for respect for the dignity of the individual, for popular participation in politics, for civic equality, for free enterprise, for the right of criticism, for a host of other characteristics which lead us to describe our civilization as a free society. Even here, however, the average American fails to appreciate many of the cultural traditions which influence European events. We sometimes also fail to understand the tremendous economic and social pressures to which modern European society must adjust these traditions.

How much less do we comprehend the traditions of the Chinese scene. And yet, despite the lack of cultural ties with the Far East, we know that Oriental problems are closely connected with our own. America's course of empire did not stop when our own Pacific shores were reached. In company with the imperialistic

powers of Europe, we took an active part in opening Japan and China to foreign trade, in acquiring extra-territorial rights, in taking native areas under our protection. In the Far East we have become "one of the boys" in imperialistic enterprises; indeed we have sometimes regarded other nations as interlopers. In some respects the war with Japan was an American war in a sense the war in Europe never was.

There is no comparable popular basis for appreciating American national interest in the Middle East. This is not to say that no basis for a cultural affinity exists. Many of the tools of our civilization, such as the alphabet and the basic processes of our mathematics, were developed by the ancient peoples of the Nile and Mesopotamian river valleys. But there have been so many intervening links in the chain—Greece and Rome, for instance—that we are no longer conscious of a relationship between ancient Babylonia, let us say, and our Western science of today. At most we are conscious of our religious heritage from the monotheistic faith of the Semites. But even here our allegiance is limited, stemming from a reading of the Bible and clouded by sentiment. We recognize the influence of the Hebrews on Christianity but any acknowledgement of a debt to Islamic culture is completely foreign to our habits of thought.

Nor has there been any particular reason for the United States to establish a tradition of commercial or strategic interest in the Middle East. The Middle East has not been, for us, a vulnerable junction of communication lines, as it has been for Great Britain; nor a road to warmer waters and the open seas, as it has been for Russia; nor an eastward goal of empire, as it has been for Germany and Italy; nor a cultural outpost, as it has been for France. Without the cultural ties which link us to Europe, without the long-standing commercial interests we have in the Far East, the average American lacks a "feel" for the Middle East and its problems.

And yet it is obvious to all who concern themselves with the question of how to make friends among nations that our interests

in the Middle East are vital and must be understood. Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the Arab world occupy the middle position with respect to Russia, while Western Europe and the Far East occupy the two flanks. What drew the European powers to the Middle East now draws us: its central location at the junction of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Even if our interest in the Middle East arose merely from its strategic location with respect to the Soviet Union, our role there would be important and difficult enough. But simultaneously there have appeared upon the stage two further factors, as though introduced by a malicious playwright for the purpose of complicating the plot—oil and Palestine. Thus, American Middle Eastern policy is formed amid arguments over three recently developed interests—strategic position, exploitation of some of the world's richest oil deposits, and the settlement of the political future of the Holy Land. And too often the disputants have ignored the fact that the United States in the past century has been developing a reputation among the peoples of the Middle East. That reputation—what the Arabs, the Iranians, and the Turks think of us—is also an important condition under which U. S. policy must be cast.

2. The United States In Middle Eastern Eyes

It was in 1800 that an American warship, the U. S. S. Washington under the command of Commodore Bainbridge, first visited Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman Empire. The visit was unintentional. When Commodore Bainbridge called at the port of Algiers to deliver our annual tribute to the Barbary pirates, the Dey "requested" him (training guns on the American vessel) to deliver his tribute in turn to the Turkish Sultan. The Commodore, after a vain protest, was forced to comply. He was received hospitably enough by the Turkish authorities, but this was an ignominious beginning for U. S. relations with the Middle East.

It was another 30 years before the United States signed a commercial treaty and established diplomatic relations with the Turks. The main American aim was to obtain privileges as favorable as those enjoyed by European nations through "capitulatory" agreements whereby the nationals of the big powers could take advantage of low customs duties and special juridical rights in law cases.

Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century the trend of American policy in the Middle East tended to follow the pattern of imperialism set by European nations. However, it was not until the early years of the twentieth century that our expansive energy began to be felt. In 1908 the United States government backed negotiations for a railroad concession in Asia Minor on behalf of a private American business concern. This was the famous Chester concession, which, if it had been pushed to completion, would have secured not only the right to build certain

railway lines in what is now southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, but also the exclusive privilege of exploiting all natural resources for about 25 miles on either side of the right of way. As the proposed lines were laid out, the concessionaire would have gained control of the Kirkuk and Mosul oil fields and what have since proved to be the most productive copper, chrome, and iron ore deposits in Turkey.

After the State Department had undertaken considerable diplomatic activity on behalf of the Chester group, the backers of the enterprise suddenly lost confidence (it was 1911 and Turkey was then at war with Italy) and withdrew their financial support. The upshot of the affair was that the United States entered World War I with no direct commitments or significant material interests in the Middle East.

THE OPEN DOOR TO OIL

The role in international affairs played before World War I by the development of rail communications in the Middle East has since been assumed by the exploitation of oil. In 1920 Great Britain and France agreed that they would share between them the prewar concession which the Turkish Petroleum Company, an Anglo-German concern, had over the oil deposits of northern Iraq. However, at the Lausanne Conference, held in 1923 to settle the future of the Ottoman Empire, the United States successfully argued for an Open Door policy in the Arab areas (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan) which were to be set up as mandates under the tutelage of France and Great Britain. The United States argued that the mandatory power had to take into consideration all concerns which expressed an interest in and were capable of contributing toward the development of natural resources such as oil. As a result of this diplomatic pressure, two American oil companies, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum, were admitted to a slightly less than one quarter interest in the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) which was formed to replace the Turkish Petroleum Company. The rest of IPC was owned by

French, Dutch, and British interests, predominantly the last.

Our so-called Open Door policy represented an advance in concessionary agreements because it substituted a multi-national group for rival national concessions and thus minimized the danger of friction. Nevertheless, the multi-national company which emerged was in some respects just as monopolistic and exclusive as the pre-war concessions held by individual European powers. Our Open Door policy turned out to be little more than a device to prevent interested American companies from being excluded from profitable enterprises. In fields where American capital was not interested, we made no objection to the privileged positions that France and Britain managed to establish. Nor did we display any particular concern that the natural resources of the mandated territories should be exploited in favor of the local population rather than in favor of the mandatory powers.

AMERICANS TEACH DEMOCRACY

Despite its Open Door policy, the United States—in contrast to Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Italy—engaged in relatively little diplomatic activity in the Middle East until World War II. The same contrast does not apply, however, to the cultural field, where we have equalled, if not surpassed all the others, with the possible exception of France.

American missionaries first arrived in Turkey, Syria, and Palestine in the 1820's, although it was not until the next decade, after the commercial treaty of 1830, that their activities got well under way. Owing to the difficulties of carrying on large-scale evangelical work among the orthodox Moslem population, missionary efforts followed two major directions—the establishment of a Protestant church among the Christian minorities, primarily Armenian and non-Moslem Arabs; and the erection of schools, colleges, and hospitals.

The most famous of the American colleges were Robert College, founded in Constantinople in 1863, and the Syrian Protestant College (now the American University of Beirut), founded in



1866. There were also schools and colleges at Smyrna (now Izmir) in Turkey, at Cairo, in the interior of Asia Minor, and in Iran. It is generally conceded that Robert College graduates, imbued with the American democratic belief in political self-determination, played a significant role in Bulgaria's struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire and in the similar but unsuccessful effort by the Armenians before World War I. Syrian Protestant College graduates were likewise at the forefront of the Arab cultural and political revival in Syria and Egypt which began to make itself felt in the 1890's.

Since it was this form of American activity that most closely touched the people, it was with political disinterestedness, philanthropy, popular democracy, material wealth, and generosity that the United States was associated in Middle Eastern minds after World War I. This picture of America was re-enforced by Wilsonian idealism. America was in the war not for itself but to "make the world safe for democracy." The twelfth of Wilson's famous Fourteen Points specifically declared that:

> The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantee.

The mandatory system, whereby the Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire were to be guided toward independence under the tutelage of European powers, was fathered in part by President Wilson as a means of carrying out this principle. Wilson's sponsorship of the League of Nations was taken as further evidence of our disinterested concern for international peace and justice.

Expectation was high in 1919 that Wilsonian ideals would prevail. The Arabs, the Armenians, the Kurds, the Zionists, the Greeks, the Turks all presented their national and frequently conflicting claims to the representatives of the Big Four (Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States) in Paris with hopes of receiving justice as they saw it. And these hopes were pinned primarily upon the United States, which had entered into no secret commitments during the war (as had all the other Allied powers) and had no known political ambitions in the area.

In the spring and summer of 1919 the American King-Crane Commission toured Palestine, Syria, and Turkey to study the

desires of the inhabitants. Its report showed a marked preference for the United States on the part of the local populations. Wilson's willingness to delimit the frontiers of a proposed Armenia and to consider an American mandate over it gave promise that the United States was not only advocating a new regime in international affairs but would participate actively in carrying it through.

DISILLUSIONMENT AND FRUSTRATION

Disillusionment rapidly followed. The mandates, as they were finally assigned, ignored the wishes of the Arabs. They were entrusted to countries not of their choice but in accordance with power politics. Arab lands, moreover, were partitioned into five separate states in a way that did not meet the wishes of many of the peoples concerned. It became obvious that the mandatory system had at least some of the stigma of the old imperialism and that France and Great Britain were more concerned with their national interests than with training the Arabs for independence. There was disillusionment also with the United States, for the U. S. Senate not only refused to accept a mandate over Armenia but subsequently even refused to enter the League of Nations.

The reasons for this reversal were numerous. There was, for one thing, the U. S. trend toward isolationism. In the Middle East itself there were two further reasons for the failure of Wilson's ideal of a peaceful settlement based on the principle of self-determination and tutelage toward independence. First, there was the resurgence of Russia and Turkey, which made the maps drawn at the Paris Peace Conference so much waste paper with regard to the possibility of an independent Armenia. The Turks also blocked plans for Greek and Italian expansion into Asia Minor, as had been envisaged in some of the Allied wartime agreements.

In the second place, the numerous claims presented to the representatives of the Allied powers in Paris were conflicting. In an area where primary loyalties did not yet have a regional or even a national basis, but rather a cultural or narrowly sectarian one, it was impossible to carry the principle of self-determination to

its logical conclusion without fragmentizing the area and antagonizing much of its population. The Armenians and Kurds in eastern and southern Asia Minor could not be assigned territory without antagonizing the Turks; nor the Assyrians in northern Iraq without antagonizing the Arabs. In Lebanon, where the Arab population is divided almost equally between Moslems and Christians, there were conflicting sympathies for a united Arab state and a stronger tie with the more cosmopolitan Mediterranean culture. The Zionists could not be granted their full aims in Palestine without eventual conflict with the Arab population already resident there.

If the Allied powers had been sincere in their supposed aim of promoting the political independence of the Arab lands, they might have created a settlement and followed a policy which would have tended to minimize these differences in favor of regional solidarity. It was all too easy, however, to play upon the conflicts, to foster them in such a fashion that the Arab world would remain politically divided. The partitioning of the mandated Arab territories after World War I possibly embittered Arab nationalists more than their failure to achieve complete independence.

THE U. S. SALVAGES ITS REPUTATION

However, the refusal of the United States to have any part in the post-war settlement helped to preserve its reputation for high-mindedness. If America failed to establish a just peace, at least it refused to be an active partner in the big power settlement that was substituted for it.

The pre-war renown for humanitarianism which the United States had enjoyed was now re-enforced by the large-scale relief carried on among the Armenians and other World War I "DP's" of the Middle East. The Armenians, as a result of their massacre by the Turks in 1915–17, came to occupy much the same place in American sympathies that the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution

do today. Private American sources contributed approximately $40,000,000 to Armenian and Syrian relief between 1919 and 1923. The Arabs, particularly, regarded this outpouring of disinterested generosity, coupled with the greatly expanded work of the American University of Beirut, as an indication of United States consideration for the economic welfare and political advancement of the Middle East.

America's post-war reception in Turkey for a time was less cordial than that extended by the Arabs. In the course of the campaign to raise Armenian relief funds, a considerable amount of vilification was heaped on the head of the Turk. Moreover, the Turkish resurgence, which culminated in the creation of a vigorous republic in 1923 under the dynamic figure of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, took a nationalistic course not conducive to foreign religious and educational activity. Yet here, too, as time went on, the Turkish impulse to create a Western-style state resulted in increased demand for education in Western techniques. American colleges, primarily Robert College in Istanbul, came to be utilized and appreciated by the Turks as well as by the non-Moslem minorities.

THE BALANCE SHEET

How is American activity in the Middle East as it emerged from the World War I peace settlement to be evaluated?

In commercial affairs our advocacy of the Open Door in the Arab mandates carried us a step beyond the monopolistic foreign concessions which previously had been the rule. In theory, the Open Door carried with it the idea of equal opportunity, free enterprise, and all the other properties of the American economic way of life. In practice, however, it meant merely insistence upon American participation if Americans so wished. The Iraq Petroleum Company which resulted from this insistence was at least multi-national in character. It fell short of any ideal international supervision of the distribution of the world's oil production, but

by representing four nations and most of the world-wide marketers, it prevented the concessions from falling exclusively into the hands of one or two Allied powers.

Politically, American interest in the Middle East remained negative. We showed great concern for the welfare of the Armenians but refused to involve ourselves in any official way in their political future. We likewise expressed sympathy for the national aspirations of the Zionists in Palestine but again failed to take any governmental step to aid in their realization. We accepted the mandates as actually constituted although it was obvious from the first that they fell short of Wilsonian ideals of self-determination. In brief, the United States saw no reason to be sufficiently concerned with the Middle East to do anything about its political future.

It was our philanthropic activity that continued to spell America to the peoples of the Middle East. And there is no doubt that many Americans thought about the Middle East—if we thought about it all—in the terms of philanthropic ventures. Whatever the advantages of this concentration on social and cultural welfare, it left us mentally and morally unprepared for the responsibilities that World War II has thrust so rudely upon us.

3. Soviet Expansion

The events of World War II and the years immediately following have shaken our complacent pre-war approach to the Middle East. The oil deposits of Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian peninsula have been lifted from the realm of commercial resources to that of strategic necessities, and our official interest in them has multiplied accordingly. When it became apparent that Great Britain could no longer maintain unilaterally its previous dominant position throughout the area, it became necessary for the United States to assume a measure of responsibility for Middle Eastern stability. This process has meant not only some revision of Anglo-American relations but also direct U. S. concern in the affairs of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. Above all, World War II brought home to us the importance of the Middle East as a base for diplomatic and military operations. Our continued struggle with Soviet Russia is a constant reminder that we cannot afford to let the Middle East fall into the hands of a single aggressive, antagonistic, totalitarian world power.

THE TURKISH STRAITS AGAIN

Evidence of the Soviet Union's desire to strengthen its position in the Middle East found concrete expression in the renewal of the old Russian claim for a direct share in the control of the Turkish Straits. At the Yalta Conference in February, 1945 the Soviet government introduced, and Great Britain and the United States ac-

cepted in principle, a resolution that there should be a post-war revision of the Montreux Convention governing passage of the Straits. The Montreux Convention, an international agreement signed in 1936 by nations in the Black Sea area plus Britain, France, and Japan, was negotiated during a period of Turkish-Soviet friendship. On paper it gave Russia numerous advantages but left control of the Straits substantially in Turkish hands.

During World War II Russia became increasingly critical of Turkey's policy, charging that it had actually been one of benevolent neutrality toward Germany. In 1944 the Russian press and radio began claiming territory in northeastern Turkey which had been ceded to Russia in 1878 and given back to Turkey in 1921. In 1945 claim was also made to a strip of Turkey's eastern Black Sea coast on the basis of a vague historical connection with what is now the Soviet Republic of Georgia. In March, 1945 the Soviet Union also renounced its 1921 treaty of friendship with Turkey. It became perfectly clear that Moscow was attempting to bring Turkey within its orbit and that its conception of a new regime for the Straits would fall within this general policy.

At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945 the matter of revision was taken up again, and it was agreed that Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union should severally present Turkey with their thoughts as to what form a revision should take.

The United States was first to formulate its ideas, which it presented to Turkey on November 2. The plan was generous to the Soviet Union, for it granted to the Black Sea powers complete freedom of passage for their warships, both in time of peace and in time of war. It excluded the warships of all other powers except as by agreement with the Black Sea powers or in fulfillment of United Nations obligations. The traditional principle of freedom of passage for commercial vessels at all times was also reaffirmed. The U. S. basis for revision of the Straits convention was acceptable to both the Turkish and the British governments.

The U. S. offer gave the Soviet Union and the other Black Sea powers all they had ever hoped for as far as conditions governing passage through the Straits are concerned. Disagreement arose over methods of control. Whereas the United States insisted upon an international guarantee worked out in connection with the United Nations and administered by Turkey, in whose territory the Straits lay, the Soviet Union in its note presented August 7, 1946 insisted on control by the regional Black Sea group. It also insisted that defense of the Straits should be controlled jointly by Turkey and the Soviet Union.

Whatever the theoretical justification of the Russian stand, the realities of present day politics have led the Western powers to oppose Moscow's views. The Black Sea powers now consist of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. All but the last are under Soviet domination. It is easy to conclude from precedent that joint Soviet-Turkish defense of the Straits would lead first to friction and then to Soviet domination of a vital part of Turkey, and very likely in time to a considerable degree of control over the whole country. This was the thought that lay behind the U. S. State Department view, expressed to Moscow on August 19, 1946 in a note enumerating points of difference. There the matter still stands today.

Although the Straits question in 1945–46 did not receive the same excited press treatment that American-Soviet differences over Iran did, it represented a significant step in the evolution of our post-war policy toward Russia and the Middle East. The United States was not a signatory to the Montreux Convention or to any preceding Straits agreement. Our active intervention in this instance marked the first time that we had taken an official role, not to mention the initiative, in shaping a political settlement in the Middle East. We also indicated the principle on which we were going to take a stand—that of international agreement for international waterways in opposition to regional control. We also underwrote, indirectly, the independence and sovereignty of the

Turkish government in a move which foreshadowed the Truman Doctrine.

RUSSIAN PENETRATION OF IRAN

In November, 1945, only two weeks after the United States had presented its note outlining a new regime for the Black Sea Straits, a Soviet-backed revolt broke out in Azerbaijan, the northwestern province of Iran.

Azerbaijan is strategically located, for it occupies a central position between the Soviet Union on the north, Turkey on the west, and Iraq on the south. It might be presumed, moreover, that its Azerbaijani and Armenian population could be attracted toward the Azerbaijani and Armenian Soviet Republics just over the border, and its Kurdish population toward the large number of Kurds in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. In addition, Iran's administration of its outlying provinces is markedly in favor of the powerful land-owning class, the only class adequately represented in the Majlis, or parliament.

There was good reason for the Russians to suppose, therefore, that not only the facts of geography but also the social and political organization of Azerbaijan were conducive to a successful revolt against the "tyranny" of Teheran. Moreover, Soviet troops had been garrisoned in Azerbaijan since the Anglo-Soviet occupation of 1942, designed to safeguard the Allied supply route from the Persian Gulf to the Russian Caucasus.

When the Iranian government attempted to send troops into Azerbaijan to quell the revolt—as it was entitled to do under the terms of the 1942 treaty governing the Anglo-Soviet occupation—they were barred by Soviet authorities. In January and February, 1946, the Soviets began to bring mobile weapons, including tanks and heavy field guns, into Azerbaijan and to dispose them in such a fashion that it became obvious that the Russians intended to force a *coup d'état* in Teheran.

The Soviet objective was two-fold: First, to establish in Azerbaijan a base for possible operations against Turkey, Iraq, and



the rest of Iran; and, secondly, to bring pressure on the Iranian government to grant an extensive oil and mineral concession in the northern province of Iran which Moscow had attempted but failed to obtain in 1944.

At first the Soviets were successful. Ahmad Qavam, a man acceptable to the Russians, became Prime Minister of Iran on January 27, 1946, and three weeks later journeyed to Moscow to discuss the situation. But this was only the beginning of long and

crucial negotiations during the course of which Iran called in the United Nations Security Council. Despite Russian objections, the Iranian question was put on the Security Council's agenda and remained there while Moscow and Teheran dickered.

Finally, on April 5 a Soviet-Iranian agreement was announced. Teheran was to settle the Azerbaijan question as an internal matter, acting with benevolent spirit toward the local population. Prime Minister Qavam was to submit to the Iranian parliament a proposal for a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company with concessionary rights in northern Iran. As the result of the agreement, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Azerbaijan on May 9, two months later than the date set by the terms of the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1942.

The settlement, as it worked out, proved to be more of a victory for Teheran than for Moscow. Elections for a new parliament were called for December, 1946. The insurgents, who had been promised a measure of autonomy, insisted that the election of the Azerbaijani representatives be supervised by the province itself. Teheran insisted that they be supervised by the central government in accordance with the electoral law. Prime Minister Qavam ordered the Iranian army to invade Azerbaijan to enforce his decision. Much to the world's surprise—and to the surprise of Iran as well—Moscow now failed to back up with material aid the provincial regime which a year earlier it had so actively supported. The insurgents were found to have little popular strength and were crushed with severity.

When the new parliament was finally organized in the summer of 1947 (elections in Iran normally take six months or more to be completed), its membership was found to favor the traditional land-owning class. Aided by the fact that the Soviets were preoccupied with world developments elsewhere, the Majlis repudiated the proposed oil agreement on October 22, 1947. Iran thus emerged from the crisis with its sovereignty intact, foreign troops gone from its soil, and free from entangling agreements.

The American influence on the settlement of the Azerbaijan affair is difficult to assess. But the crisis did mark a further significant chapter in the formulation of American Middle Eastern policy and in American-Soviet relations.

American service troops were present in Iran at the time of the Azerbaijan revolt but were evacuated by January 1, 1946 before both the British and Russian withdrawals. The United States was not a party to the 1942 occupation treaty and its only official commitment was the Teheran Declaration of 1943 in which Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt expressed unity "in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran."

American technicians, at the invitation of the Teheran government, have played a part, both before and after the crisis, in aiding in the administration of Iranian financial and economic affairs and in reorganizing the police force, the army, and the public health service. Such missions, however, had little direct bearing on official U. S. foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union.

Therefore, there was considerable speculation as to what course the American government would take as the Azerbaijan crisis came to a head. Despite U. S. initiative in the Straits question, there was considerable skepticism both in Europe and the Middle East about our readiness to tangle in rough and tumble diplomacy over an issue far from the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, it was an issue which threatened to test the infant United Nations, in its very first case, with a situation involving a major power.

Whatever temptations there were within the government to let the matter slide, it was finally agreed that the Iranian crisis was too important to be ignored. It involved the sanctity of international agreements and the principle of non-interference by major powers in the domestic affairs of small nations. It also represented a case of incipient Soviet aggression. Therefore, the State Department urged Iran to take its complaint to the Security Council

and promised full U. S. support during the debate. And throughout the Soviet-Iranian negotiations, brought to the attention of the Security Council several times, Teheran had the advantage of U. S. backing.

It is generally conceded that U. S. forcefulness aided in the firm line taken in the Security Council debates. Although Russia was not branded as an aggressor, the Iranian situation was put on the Council agenda and still remains there, to be brought up again if the Soviet Union attempts to repeat its gambit. The rather unexpected effectiveness of our tactics did much to convince us that a policy of containment and blunt speaking would have a chance of halting Soviet expansion in the Middle East.

INDEPENDENCE FOR SYRIA AND LEBANON

A by-product of the Azerbaijan crisis was U. S. support for Syria and Lebanon in their appeal to the Security Council for the removal of British and French troops from their territories. Arguing against the presence of Soviet troops in Iran, we could hardly support the continued occupation by Allied troops of two other Middle Eastern states. The case presented a new opportunity to show that U. S. policy favored treaty observance, the establishment of politically independent states in the Middle East, and peaceful settlements under the guidance of the United Nations. Moreover, by siding with the Arab states against Britain and France, the United States demonstrated that it was not governed by big power alignments but was acting as a free agent. Security Council intervention was again instrumental in reaching a prompt settlement. Both British and French troops were withdrawn from Syria and Lebanon by mutual agreement during the course of the year.

This successful use of United Nations machinery led President Truman, in his Army Day address of April 6, 1946, to declare:

> No country, great or small, has legitimate interests in the Near and Middle East which cannot be reconciled with the interests of other nations through the United Nations. The United Na-

tions have a right to insist that the sovereignty and integrity of the countries of the Near and Middle East must not be threatened by coercion or penetration.

It is doubtful if the administration foresaw at that time the crisis which was to arise in Greece a year later and the circumstances under which the United States itself was to act independently of the United Nations in protecting "sovereignty and integrity" against the threat of "coercion or penetration."

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

On February 28, 1947 the British government informed the United States that it would be unable to continue its financial assistance to Greece beyond the end of March. London suggested that the United States take over the burden and the Greek government itself appealed to Washington for aid.

It was generally admitted that without outside support the Greek government would not be able to maintain security in the country. The resulting anarchy would virtually hand Greece over to the Communist guerrillas, then being armed and re-enforced from the Soviet-dominated nations to the north. On March 12 President Truman asked Congress to vote a grant-in-aid of $400,000,000 to both the Greek and Turkish governments. The inclusion of Turkey in the program was largely our own idea and underlined the anti-Soviet element in our thinking.

The principle on which we based our action in Greece and Turkey came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. In his address before Congress, the President expressed it as follows:

> It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures . . . We must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way . . . Our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to stability and orderly processes.

However lofty the general principle of the program, the Truman Doctrine in its immediate operation was subject to two major criticisms: first, that the U. S. was bolstering a Greek government which was not essentially democratic; and, secondly, that it was by-passing the United Nations.

The United States had at least a legal basis for regarding the Greek government as the proper representative of "a free people working out its own destiny," to use President Truman's words. In 1946 an American, British and French mission (the Russians were invited but refused to cooperate) went to Greece to observe the elections. Later in the year a second mission observed the plebiscite which resulted in the return of the Greek monarchy. The members of these missions were convinced that the results represented a free expression of the Greek people. However, the group which has controlled the Greek government during the past two years has been neither liberal nor democratic in the sense of being drawn from the people or of working for the people.

President Truman stated frankly in his March 12, 1947 address to Congress that the United States regarded the United Nations as incapable of handling the Greek problem. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the U. N. was not equipped to extend such aid or to act quickly in a situation where "time was of the essence." Thus, the United Nations was by-passed without even formal notification from the United States of what we intended to do.

This feature was severely criticized in Congress, and the final appropriation bill provided that the United States would end its support whenever the General Assembly or the Security Council (where the U. S. would waive its right of veto) censured the program. It was impossible to escape the conclusion, however, that this amendment was little more than a conciliatory gesture and that the United States was not above using or ignoring the United Nations according to its advantage.

Aid to Greece and Turkey has produced material achievements. In Greece, severely ravaged by the war, the program en-

visaged economic rehabilitation as well as military assistance. But in view of the unstable political and military situation—including the actual formation of an insurgent Communist regime in the northern part of the country—the major portion of our $300,000,000 grant-in-aid has had to be spent on military needs. The most that can be said is that anarchy has been forestalled. Recent Greek government victories may pave the way for more fundamental projects of economic rehabilitation.

RESULTS OF AID TO TURKEY

Turkey, materially untouched by the war, has been under a severe financial strain through the necessity of maintaining a large standing army against constant threats from Soviet Russia. Here the U. S. aid program has been limited to direct military assistance and to the improvement of Turkey's network of strategic roads and harbor equipment. By the spring of 1948 a military training program was well under way and equipment, including tanks, artillery, training and transport aircraft, fighters and light bombers, submarines and auxiliary naval vessels, was beginning to arrive. All the equipment allotted to Turkey under the original $100,000,000 appropriation was expected to be delivered by the end of the year. Also, this past summer the U. S. Public Roads Administration began work on the planned conversion of 12,000 miles of Turkey's primitive roads into two-lane, hard-surface, all-weather routes.

Our material and moral assistance has undoubtedly been appreciated by both the Turkish and Greek nations. Yet, the most enduring impression left in the Middle East at large by our aid under the Truman Doctrine has been that the United States is far more concerned with its own peculiar interests—primarily the containment of the Soviet Union—than with more constructive objectives. Assistance to free peoples "to work out their own destinies in their own way" often seems to have been forgotten. This reaction has been partially counterbalanced by our aid to Europe under the Marshall Plan. Here we are being given credit for assistance which

is constructive, transcending the immediate problems of elementary survival and security and looking ahead to rehabilitation and economic well-being. U. S. Middle Eastern policy receives a great deal more criticism. The Arabs, particularly, look upon each American move in the light of our stand on Palestine. They are not convinced that we are carrying out the same kind of unbiased and impartial aid in the Middle East that we are in Europe.

4. Oil for War or Recovery

Closely connected with our national concern for the recovery of Europe is our interest in the oil of the Middle East. Western Hemisphere oil resources were exploited during World War II at a rate rapid enough to cause alarm over their eventual depletion. Since the Western Hemisphere is our safest and possibly our sole source of oil under future wartime conditions, there is a natural U. S. desire to utilize other oil deposits in time of peace. For this reason, as well as economic considerations, up to 82 per cent of the oil allotted to Europe by 1951 under the European Recovery Program is expected to come from the Middle East. And Middle Eastern oil production is expected to be doubled by that time.

Similar fears of an oil shortage after World War I contributed to the U. S. Open Door policy through which American companies obtained participation in the Iraq Petroleum Company, as we have already noted. Nevertheless, Great Britain dominated the production of Middle Eastern oil until about ten years ago. The largest proportion of IPC shares was owned by British interests; Iranian production was monopolized by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (controlled by the British government); the areas of oil development were in nations largely under British political influence. Today Great Britain still controls more than half of Middle Eastern production but there has been a phenomenal growth of American exploitation, particularly in Arabia. There are also enormous reserves, as yet untapped, under American concession.



U. S. CONCESSIONS IN ARABIA

In 1933 the Standard Oil Company of California obtained an extensive concession over the eastern portion of Saudi Arabia. In the following year, under the name of the Bahrein Petroleum Company (Bapco), it also obtained a concession over the Persian Gulf island of Bahrein, where oil had been discovered in 1932. In 1936 Standard of California was joined in both enterprises by the Texas Company. Subsequently reorganized as the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), these two companies negotiated a greatly extended concession in Saudi Arabia in 1939. In 1947 they were joined by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum, the two American participants in the Iraq Petroleum Company. Development of both the Bahrein and Saudi

MAJOR OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

Arabian oil fields have thus remained completely in the hands of American concessionaires.

In addition to these exclusive American concessions, the Gulf Oil Corporation obtained in 1934 a half-interest in the Kuwait Oil Company, the other half being held by the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Finally, in June, 1948, the American Independent Oil Company announced that it had secured a concession over the rights of Kuwait in the neutral zone between Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Actual production of oil from these American concessions was largely a war and post-war development. Bahrein approached its present level of approximately 30,000 barrels a day in 1937, but the Saudi Arabian fields did not begin to produce in quantity until 1944, and Kuwait not until 1946. At present the Saudi Arabian fields have far outstripped the others with a daily production of approximately 425,000 barrels. Production is expected to reach 700,000 barrels a day by 1951. Unless Iranian output is also increased above its present level of 500,000 barrels a day, this will make Saudi Arabia the fourth largest oil-producing country in the world, after the United States, Venezuela, and the Soviet Union.

GOVERNMENT VS. PRIVATE INTERESTS

It was to our national interest not only to boost Arabian oil production during the war but also to increase refinery capacity so that U. S. naval vessels in the Pacific could receive their fuel directly from Middle Eastern fields. But the development of refineries and the building of pipelines from oil fields to refining centers required large capital investments. Private oil companies were reluctant to undertake considerable risks—considerable even in peacetime—in investing large sums in Arabia during a period of extreme political insecurity. Therefore, the problem seemed to call for some form of government action.

During the war one proposal under consideration was public ownership—allowing the U. S. government to acquire the stock of Aramco. In 1944 another proposal called for construction and



ownership by the U. S. government of a 1,100-mile pipeline from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean to carry Aramco crude oil to refining centers. Such schemes, however, ran into violent opposition, notably from competing oil companies, which challenged government entry into the petroleum industry, and some Zionists, who objected to them as a potential source of subsidy and support for Arab states.

Since the war, the Persian Gulf-Mediterranean pipeline project has been reborn, this time under the auspices of a private corpo-

BLACK SEA
Salonika
Istanbul
Batum
Ankara
GREECE
Athens
Izmir
TURKEY
CRETE
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
CYPRUS
Euphrates
SYRIA
Tripoli
Beirut
LEBANON
Damascus
Haifa
Alexandria
PALESTINE
Amman
Jerusalem
Cairo
SUEZ CANAL
TRANS-JORDAN
LIBYA
Nile
EGYPT
RED SEA
Mecca
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN
SCALE OF MILES
0 100 200 300
THE MIDDLE EAST

UNION
CASPIAN
SEA
Baku
Tabriz
Tehran
AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
Tigris
Abadan
Basra
KUWAIT
PERSIAN
GULF
BAHREIN I.
PAKISTAN
Karachi
yadh
ABIA
ARABIAN
SEA
OMAN
CAPITALS
OIL FIELDS
PIPELINES
AIRFIELDS
GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

ration, the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company (TAPline). Work on the line was begun at both ends but has been interrupted for several reasons. One is the unsettled condition of Palestine and its effect on the neighboring Arab states. Another is the current refusal of the U. S. government—for military reasons—to approve the further export of steel for the pipeline.

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED OIL POLICY

Some of the issues which have confused U. S. oil interests in the Middle East have now been cleared away. The possibility of governmental participation in exploitation has lapsed; the success of Zionist aspirations in Palestine is fairly well assured; independent oil companies have managed to obtain interests in Persian Gulf production and have therefore lost some of their motive for opposing government support for foreign ventures. It may now become easier for Americans to view so-called "oil imperialism" in a less controversial light.

Another question must be answered, however, before our government can follow a well-integrated oil policy in the Middle East: Are we concerned with Middle Eastern oil primarily because of its wartime value for military operations or because of its economic value for peacetime recovery? Both considerations, admittedly must claim a share of our attention. But unless we are prepared to admit that the aim of American foreign policy is to prepare for war rather than to prevent it, the value of Middle Eastern oil for economic rehabilitation, and thus for world stability, would appear to take precedence. The uncertainty in our minds over these issues is illustrated by the example of the Trans-Arabian pipeline. There seems to be general agreement that such a line is an economically sound project which would bring oil more cheaply to European and eventually American markets. In this, the pipeline is important to the success of the Marshall Plan. Nevertheless, the U. S. military has vetoed the project because it might become a strategic liability, impossible to defend in time of war. And for the time being at least, their counsel prevails.

In addition to the value of oil to European recovery, there is a further consideration favoring its utmost utilization—the economic development of the Middle East itself. The stability and friendship of the oil-producing states is as important to us as the stability and friendship of Western Europe. And a way must be found to convert the Middle East's one enormous economic asset —petroleum—to its own profit.

This is not an easy task. For one thing there is a serious maldistribution of oil resources between the various Middle Eastern states. The richest newly-discovered deposits lie in areas which have long subsisted on the most primitive economies—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrein, and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia, according to a recent survey, receives annual foreign exchange benefits from oil operations amounting to $15.25 per capita of the population. The 26,000 inhabitants of the peninsula of Qatar receive $19.25 each. For Bahrein the figure is $55 per capita. And for the tiny Sheikdom of Kuwait, which sits over an estimated nine billion barrels of oil, the benefits amount to $306 per person. How the 80,000 people of Kuwait are to absorb this income is a question to which no answer has yet been found. Meanwhile, the benefit per person in foreign exchange for other Arab states is much lower. Iraq, the nearest rival to Saudi Arabia, receives only $7 per capita.

One factor is expected to help spread the income derived from oil royalties more evenly throughout the Middle East—the development of pipelines and refineries. Current plans call for the building of new lines from Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait to Tripoli in Syria, Sidon in Lebanon, and Haifa in Israel, as well as the Trans-Arabian pipeline now in abeyance. Countries which at present have few oil resources of their own will thus receive benefits from the payment of transit and terminal fees.

The oil companies, notably Aramco, seconded by the U. S. State Department, have taken an active interest in directing at least a part of the royalties into productive channels. In Saudi Arabia, for example, a major portion of the $30,000,000 accruing

directly to King Ibn Saud is being spent in a constructive fashion. Some 8,000 experimental acres of formerly uncultivated land are now being irrigated to produce vegetable and fodder crops; numerous new wells dot the country; deep-water piers are being built at the Persian Gulf and Red Sea ports of Dammam and Jidda; the capital city of Riyadh is being supplied with electricity; improved airports are being built at Jidda and Medina; some eight hospitals and clinics are being constructed and equipped; and the most ambitious project of all—a railroad from Dammam to Riyadh—has been pushed as far as the oil field at Abqaiq.

The Arabian American Oil Company has not assisted in these projects—and further programs to improve the living standards of its own Arab employees—from a spirit of altruism but from a realization that its own welfare is affected by the political stability and economic prosperity of the country in which it operates. This is a sound business concept which, although it may be labelled as "imperialism" or "paternalism," nevertheless brings substantial benefits to the natives of the oil-producing areas.

OTHER ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Related to both the exploitation of oil and U. S. strategic interests in the Middle East is the development of aviation throughout the area. Air routes today crisscross in Asia Minor, Egypt, and the Arab lands in the same way that caravan routes did in ancient days. During the war the United States built major airfields at Cairo, Egypt, and at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and cooperated in the improvement of Turkish air facilities. These countries are now essential links in our international air service to India and the Far East. Since the war, Trans-World Airlines and Pan-American Airways, the two American companies flying to the Middle East, have been working with local governments to establish up-to-date service.

The possibility of broad economic development of the Middle East on a regional basis was opened up by another wartime creation, the Middle East Supply Center. The British organized the

MIDDLE EAST—CROSSROAD OF WORLD AIRWAYS



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

center in 1941 and the United States participated in its activities from 1942 onward. The wartime problem was to organize the region's economy in a way that would conserve shipping space and still supply the Middle East with needed foodstuff, manufactures, and other imports. The area covered by the center's activities extended from Libya to Iran and as far south as the Sudan.

In order to make the region less dependent on imports, two million additional acres were brought under cereal cultivation by such expedients as converting Egyptian cotton fields to wheat and ploughing new lands in Syria with the aid of tractors. In the course of this experiment, Middle Eastern governments came together, exchanged technical information, and engaged in eco-

nomic collaboration for their mutual advantage. This, of course, was a wartime measure carried out under Anglo-American supervision. It will be a useful pattern for peacetime cooperation only if Middle Eastern governments discover more unity and stability than they enjoy at present.

The significant fact to note when surveying American commercial activity in the Middle East, whether it be petroleum exploitation, airline operation, or technical assistance in agriculture, irrigation, power, or industry, is that it involves much more than the mere buying and selling of commodities. It is activity of great strategic and diplomatic importance to us, and one that can lead us into the pitfalls of imperialism unless we keep clearly before us our over-all aims in the Middle East.

5. A Jewish State

The national interests of the United States in the Middle East, as surveyed so far, are not incompatible with each other. Our interest in safeguarding the area from totalitarian aggression, our interest in the peaceful exploitation of Arabian oil, and our interest in guiding Middle Eastern states toward democratic self-government are not necessarily in conflict.

At the end of World War II, we were favorably placed for pursuing all these aims. The United States had emerged as one of the two most powerful nations of the world; our word carried tremendous weight. We won the goodwill of the Iranians, the Lebanese, the Syrians, the Greeks, and the Turks by direct action in helping them to preserve or attain political independence. Our long-established cultural institutions continued to teach American ideals and techniques. Our wartime activities—including the construction of airfields, technical assistance of all sorts, and even the presence of American troops in the area—gave a new constructive sense to American relations with the Middle East.

One aspect of our post-war foreign policy, however, did not easily fit into this picture. This was our support for an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Whatever the merits of the Zionist case, active U. S. backing for a Jewish state came into open conflict with some of the other aims of our policy in the Middle East. Our support of Zionism aroused the hostility of the Arabs, a hostility plainly expressed from Egypt to Iraq, from Syria to Saudi Arabia.

How long this hostility will persist, what effect it will have on Middle Eastern peace and order, and what influence it will have

on our strategic and economic interests it is impossible to state at the present time with any degree of certainty. Some critics of our Palestine policy think that our interest in developing a stable Arab world friendly to the West has been seriously jeopardized. Others contend that the creation of a Jewish state will in itself contribute to peace and stability by providing the final settlement of an issue which has kept Arab lands in turmoil for the last 30 years. The future course of Middle Eastern politics will show which of these prognostications is correct. It is not the purpose here to condemn or defend American policy. What is needed is to try to discover how this policy developed and to evaluate its consequences.

PALESTINE CHRONOLOGY

Despite numerous expressions of American sympathy and support for Zionist aims, it was not until 1945 that the U. S. government officially began to play a leading role in shaping the political destiny of Palestine. Previously there had been Presidential declarations and Congressional resolutions favorable to Zionism, but the neutrality of our official actions is illustrated by President Roosevelt's exchange of letters with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia early in 1945. The President declared that he would take no action in his capacity as chief executive "which might prove hostile to the Arab people." Like many of the documents on the Palestine situation, from the Balfour declaration of 1917 onward, this letter was a brief, simple statement which could be interpreted in several different ways. Who was to judge, for instance, whether a specific course of action was or was not hostile to the Arab people?

The end of the war, the opening of the Nazi concentration camps, and the growing problem of displaced persons brought the Palestine crisis to a head. In August 1945 President Truman requested British Prime Minister Attlee to open the Holy Land to 100,000 displaced Jews from Europe. The British government countered with the suggestion that a joint Anglo-American Com-


THE PARTITION PLAN AND THE TRUCE
Tyre
LEBANON
SYRIA
Acre
Safad
GALILEE
Haifa
Tiberias
Nazareth
Samakh
Afula
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
Jenin
Tulkarm
Mafraq
Nablus
Jordan R.
Tel Aviv
Jaffa
Lydda
Amman
TRANS-JORDAN
Jerusalem
Gaza
Hebron
DEAD SEA
Beersheba
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NEGEB
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U.N. PARTITION BOUNDARIES
POPULATED AREAS HELD BY ISRAEL DURING THE TRUCE (JULY 18, 1948 —)
GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

mittee of Inquiry visit Palestine and consider the problem of immigration in the light of existing economic, political, and social conditions there.

The committee's unanimous report, published on May 1, 1946, endorsed the proposal to send 100,000 European Jews to Palestine. It also made nine other recommendations, including trusteeship under the United Nations and the suppression of illegal armies. In outlining a final political settlement, it rejected partition in favor of a federated or cantonal state which would be neither Jewish nor Arab. President Truman immediately expressed gratification that the committee had approved his proposal for 100,000 certificates of immigration but stated that the rest of the report would have to be taken under advisement. Britain took the attitude that the report would have to be accepted or rejected as a whole, maintaining that it was impossible to admit 100,000 refugees to Palestine without some arrangement for military security. The British sought both financial and military aid from the United States to implement the proposals.

During the summer months of 1946 an Anglo-American cabinet committee met in London to work out a compromise settlement and came up with a new cantonal plan—a central Palestinian government with near-autonomous Jewish and Arab areas. The British government then proceeded to discuss this proposal with Jewish and Arab leaders. These discussion failed to bear fruit. British Foreign Secretary Bevin maintained that the negotiations were nearing success when President Truman, on the eve of the November Congressional elections, again called for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. Zionists challenged the truth of Bevin's statement. Then followed a period of mutual recrimination, of strained Anglo-American relations, of Arab and Zionist charges and counter-charges against each other and against the United States and Britain. The British moved to halt illegal immigration into Palestine, and fresh acts of violence broke out in the Holy Land.

UNITED NATIONS ACTION

In April 1947 the British government referred the problem of Palestine to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The following month the General Assembly set up a special committee to visit the country and make its own recommendations. These were presented on August 31, 1947. The majority report urged the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, with a United Nations trusteeship over Jerusalem and its environs. A minority report advocated the creation of a single federated state. After some deliberation the majority report was accepted by the Jewish Agency, the official representative of the Zionists. It was also supported by the American and Soviet delegations.

Shortly afterwards Britain announced its determination to end the mandate over Palestine. The British tended to favor the majority report but refused to take any responsibility for enforcing a solution not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. The leaders of the Palestinian Arabs and the seven Arab states represented in the Arab League refused to accept any plan which provided for the creation of an independent Zionist state.

After three months of heated debate the U. N. General Assembly on November 29, 1947 passed a resolution favoring the partition of Palestine with some provisions for economic union between the two parts. Provisional Arab and Zionist governments were to be set up on May 15, 1948, the date by which British troops were to leave the country. As the date neared, violence spread and Palestine was on the brink of civil war. Bitter Arab reaction to the partition plan made it evident that the United Nations could not put its plan into practice without the use of force.

There were last-minute attempts to avoid violence. The United States in March proposed that Palestine be turned into a United Nations trusteeship until a calmer atmosphere prevailed. But this suggestion, following U. S. support for partition, was received with little enthusiasm by other United Nations delegations. Decision was left to the force of arms.

On May 15 the Zionists declared the creation of a State of Israel and announced its provisional government. Both the state and the government at once received *de facto* recognition from the United States and *de jure* recognition from the Soviet Union. The Arabs of Palestine did not set up an administration for their portion of the country. Instead the armies of the neighboring states marched in to "restore order" and to supervise the establishment of a unitary "democratic" state. They were unsuccessful in any attempt to penetrate the section of Palestine assigned to the Jews under the U. N. partition plan. After six weeks of fighting both sides accepted a U. N. truce proposal which, except for a nine-day lapse in June, continued in force throughout the summer. Whether the Arabs will admit the *de facto* existence of Israel and come to a settlement on this basis remains to be seen. But time favors Israel, and the longer it maintains itself the more difficult it will become for the Arabs to ignore its existence.

WHYS AND WHEREFORES

Any discussion of the motives of U. S. policy toward the Palestine situation is likely to be highly controversial. Zionists have not been satisfied with the measure of support they have received from the American government; Arabs say the Zionists have received far too much backing and often cynically lay that backing to the fact that "there are no Arab voters in the United States."

U. S. support of Zionist aspirations—whether it be too little or too much—is unique in American history. As a people, we have in the past expressed sympathy for other national movements, for Irish nationalists, for instance, or for Armenian independence. But we have not often been willing to back such sympathies with governmental action.

Also, there are aspects of Zionism which differentiate it from other national movements. Zionism is based on culture and religion; it seeks the establishment of a state in a territory which has for hundreds of years been occupied by another group. Whether religion is a sound basis for nationality is an issue which has split

the Jewish world. The American Council for Judaism, for instance, maintains that Zionism presents Jews with a choice—to regard themselves as members of a religion or as members of a nation. According to this distinction, the American concept of nationalism is in contrast to the Zionist concept. We think of a nation as made up of many religions, of a religion as followed by many nationalities.

Many other confusing strands are woven into the pattern of American support for Zionist aims. Some American Jews—but not all—fervently believe that the survival of their culture depends on the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. These Zionist supporters have constituted an effective pressure group, acting through the press, sending delegations to Congressmen and to the White House, urging the major political parties to adopt party platforms favorable to their cause. Such pressure groups, of course, are familiar to the American scene. Similar bodies have attempted to influence American policy toward Italy, India, China, Eastern Europe, Spain, and other countries or regions.

American Zionists, however, have had marked success for a number of reasons. One is the delicate electoral balance between the major political parties in the key state of New York. This has led politicians into competitive bidding for the pro-Zionist vote, although the wisdom, necessity, or effectiveness of these tactics in winning votes may be doubted. Another reason is that Jewish Zionists are strongly supported by a great many non-Jewish sympathizers among the American public. These sympathizers have been motivated by a humanitarian desire to do something about the problem of world Jewry, especially after post-war revelations of savage Nazi atrocities. They range from a few militant supporters to a large body of Americans who think of Palestine vaguely in terms of the Bible and, therefore naturally associate it with the Jews rather than with the Arabs. Although the latter are not very vocal, their sympathetic approach has given the Zionists that volume of support among the American public which is essential to the success of any political program.

It should be noted that the Arabs lack effective presentation of their case in the United States. For instance, it could be pointed out that the Arabs are as much descendants of the Philistines and Canaanites of Biblical days as the Jews of Europe are descendants of Abraham. Arabs repeatedly state that they are not responsible for Hitler's persecutions, that displaced Jews are a world problem which should be approached on a world scale, that Palestine has already taken more than its share of Jewish immigrants. These and other arguments have not received a weight in America comparable to that given to the Zionist case.

One further factor, this time in the Middle East itself, has strongly influenced the current of American thought. This has been the obvious purposefulness and technical ability of the Zionists as contrasted with the frustration, disunity, and lack of both purpose and application which have characterized the Arabs. Within 30 years—and the major achievements have come in the last 20 years—the Zionists have created a full-blown national home with an energy that has earned world-wide respect. They have accomplished this through hard work, fortitude, and determination. But they have also had advantages not possessed by the Palestinian Arabs—foreign financial support and a knowledge of Western scientific skills. The Arabs, on the other hand, are economically impoverished and must learn modern skills from scratch. More important, they are still going through the slow, arduous process of working out the relations between their own culture and the modern Western civilization which has become world-dominant and which they must comprehend to survive.

No matter how just the Arab cause, therefore, the material success of the Zionist experiment has brought support for the creation of Israel. The Arabs have learned too slowly that the right to survive must be earned.

PROFIT AND LOSS

Important as it is to understand the reasons for U. S. policy on Palestine, it is even more important to evaluate what the United

States may have gained or lost in the Middle East by pursuing that policy.

Several arguments have been made to the effect that the creation of Israel will have a favorable effect on other American interests in the Middle East. Zionists have asserted, for example, that a State of Israel will raise the economic well-being and therefore presumably win the goodwill of the surrounding Arab population; that it will serve as a leaven of Western democracy in an Arab world of feudal states; that in case of a clash with Russia, it will serve as a sure foothold; that after the General Assembly's recommendation of partition in November 1947, the successful establishment of a Zionist state became essential for the preservation of the United Nations; and finally, that in view of Zionist determination, the creation of an independent Israel is an unavoidable prerequisite to the peaceful development of the Middle East.

Most of these arguments are speculative in character, and their validity still remains to be demonstrated. For the time being, at least, they are offset by the unprecedented antagonism toward the United States immediately expressed among the Arab peoples.

Although the Soviet Union joined the United States in supporting partition, the onus has been placed primarily on us for two reasons. In the first place, it is only since the spring of 1947 that Russia has favored a Jewish state; prior to that its traditional policy had been anti-Zionist. In coming out in favor of partition, Andrei Gromyko, Soviet delegate to the U. N., made it clear that Russia did so only as second choice to a unified Palestine. From Gromyko's stand it was evident that Moscow's motive was the ousting of Britain from a strategic area rather than aid for Zionism.

The United States, on the other hand, has long contributed the major part of the material goods that have made the Zionist establishment in Palestine possible; much of Israel's modern military equipment has been financed by funds from America; there has been discussion of an American loan to Israel. These facts have led the Arabs to hold the United States, rather than

Russia or Britain, responsible for making the creation of Israel physically possible.

In the second place, the United States is closely associated with Britain in the big power conflict with Russia. It is much easier, therefore, for the Arabs to bring the United States into the circle of their previous antipathy for Britain than to transfer their antagonism to the Soviet Union.

The Arab reaction has not been expressed in the cancellation of oil concessions or in other obvious but futile gestures. The danger lies in more indirect effects. A fog of suspicion has been cast over all American activity in Arab countries. Here again we enter the realm of speculation, but if the present mood of the Arabs persists, Americans will have difficulty in recapturing a spirit of mutual trust. Arabs will continue to take American dollars and to acquire American skills. But they will tend to reject Americans ideals and the ideals of Western democracy in general as so much hypocrisy.

How U. S. Palestine policy will affect the course of Arab nationalism is also a matter of speculation. The emerging nationalistic spirit of the Arabs, stemming from the struggle against the Ottoman Turk at the close of the nineteenth century, has moved toward democracy slowly. Some of the forms of British and French parliamentary government were adopted by the Arab states after World War I, particularly in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. There has been some trend toward middle-class nationalism on the Western model, but personal leadership has always counted heavily in the Arab lands. An urge for Arab unity, checked by the partition of the mandated states in the World War I settlement, has received new impetus in the formation of the Arab League in 1945.

Since the 1930's an Arab school of thought has also developed which seeks salvation through methods inimical to the West—religious fanaticism and totalitarianism. This school emerged briefly at times of violent crisis, as under the Mufti Haj Amin el-Husseini during the Arab uprising in Palestine in 1936–39, and in Rashid Ali's anti-British, pro-Nazi *coup d'état* in Iraq in 1941.

Palestine has served as a rallying cry for both moderate Arab nationalists and Arab extremists. The Arab League, by taking the initiative in the fight to forestall the creation of a Zionist state, has prevented the more fanatical school from coming to the fore in the present crisis. But now that the Arab League has apparently failed in its Palestine efforts, the future course of Arab nationalism is impossible to predict. Resort to a totalitarian ideology is a real alternative for some sections of the Arab world. On the other hand, Palestine may prove to be just the lesson the Arab peoples have needed to bring about unity in more moderate pattern.

Since the struggle between the West and Soviet Russia is primarily ideological, continued Arab antipathy could be of considerable moment. Cynicism toward the ideals of Western Europe will make the Arabs just that much less ready to cooperate with us in a future time of crisis. They may not have military strength, but they nevertheless occupy an extremely strategic area where the temper of the population could prove a deciding factor.

THE STRENGTH OF RUSSIA'S HAND

Has our stand in favor of Zionism really strengthened Russia's position in the Middle East?

There is little doubt that the Soviet position is *relatively* stronger through the great decrease in British and American prestige. Communism now has a potentially more fertile field in view of the renewed bitterness of the Arabs, a bitterness not only against the West but also against the existing Arab governments which have signally failed to stop the Zionists. Whether or not the Russians can reap a harvest from this resentment remains to be seen.

Among the Arabs there is a strong resistance to communism, but Arab society is undergoing a profound transformation. The political ideology of the young intellectuals and the workers, increasingly significant classes, is in no way set. Therefore, communism may yet win converts in the Middle East and score a long-run victory as a result of the Palestine crisis.

The Russians probably raised their prestige in Israel, also.

Although the provisional government is inclined toward the West, some sections of the militant underground look toward the Soviet Union for inspiration. These elements constitute a force sufficiently strong to make it impossible to predict categorically that Israel will be whole-heartedly on the side of the West in case of a showdown.

HOW DO WE STAND?

As might be expected, American activities in the Middle East have been many and varied, conducted independently of each other and frequently at cross-purposes. They have included a century of religious, philanthropic, and educational activity which has had the broad aim of evolving higher standards of living in the Middle East and of making the populations more receptive to American ways of thinking. There has been a moderate amount of normal trade, but the most significant economic relationship has been through American exploitation of Arab oil resources. We have exhibited a notable sympathy for minority populations which has ranged from privately sponsored philanthropy to direct political support in the case of the Zionists in Palestine.

Since these American interests and activities developed with little thought of a comprehensive national foreign policy in the Middle East, the task before our government now is twofold: first, to shape a course of action calculated to reach a broad, general goal; and, secondly, to guide individual American interests toward the same general aims.

Our primary political goal in the Middle East at present is to keep the area free from domination by the Soviet Union. To this end we have striven for political stability by supporting the governments of Middle Eastern states and have made a try, at least, at finding a peaceful solution for the Palestine problem.

Where we have most signally fallen down has been in our failure to work out a coordinated policy with Great Britain, whose present interests in the Middle East most closely parallel our own.

Anglo-American cooperation during the war—military, political, and economic—failed to survive the peace, particularly in those aspects touching on the Middle East. The fault probably lies with both parties: with the British for attempting to pursue a post-war policy based on their dominant pre-war financial and political position; and with the United States, first, for not thinking out any fully rounded policy at all, and, secondly, for not making sufficiently clear that its newly acquired "national" interests were in reality the interests of world stability, and thus Britain's as much as America's.

Still a further goal before us is to win the Middle East to Western principles of social and international relations. The peoples of the Middle East have been predisposed in our favor but are now in danger of being diverted to some form of totalitarianism unless the West can breathe new conviction and sincerity into the ideals it professes.

In all these aims our varied activities in the Middle East—our business dealings, our oil undertakings, our cultural institutions, our humanitarian sympathies—can be made to play a part—provided that Americans be given sufficient guidance to think in terms of the broad interests of a world power.

Problems Facing Israel

by Carl Hermann Voss

The emergence of the Jewish state of Israel after an interlude of nineteen centuries is a unique phenomenon in the history of mankind. Nations have been known to regain independence after a break of some decades, and even of a few centuries; but, hitherto, the achievement of independence occurred only in cases where the national group continued to live uninterruptedly on its traditional territory. The resurrection of a nation, after physical dispersion from its soil and after almost two thousand years of wandering from one country to another, stands unparalleled in the annals of mankind.

Before re-creating their ancient state, the Jews were compelled to take a first step: the resettlement of Palestine. To visualize this process of resettlement one must think of the colonization movements which brought about the formation of the United States of America, as well as most of the British dominions, and combine with that thought a mental picture of the struggles for national independence which resulted in the birth of modern Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Balkan states. The emergence of Israel is a result of just such a dual process.

The Jews had to acquire independence in the manner by which it has come to other nations: neither as a gift of mankind nor as a verdict of an international tribunal, but rather through revolution and war. First came a revolution against the British administration. After the British withdrawal, the Jews had to defend themselves against the armed opposition of the Arab states. Had the revolt against Britain failed, it is doubtful whether the United

Nations would have recommended the formation of the Jewish state. Had the Jews lost the war, the U. N. partition recommendation would hardly have saved their state. But the Jews succeeded in both tests. Israel has now become a fact, and attention is gradually turning toward the problems which Israel may be expected to face in the future.

ISRAEL AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Among these problems, first place must be given to the question of Israel's relationship to the international community, the United Nations.

Under the original partition resolution as adopted by the United Nations Assembly on November 29, 1947, various organs of the United Nations were to exercise considerable supervisory powers over both the Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. The administration of Jerusalem, supervision over shrines and holy places, and the economic relations between the two new states were all to be placed in some measure under international guardianship. The United Nations did little to carry out the terms of its own resolution, and the solution now emerging after months of warfare differs materially from the original blueprint. It is likely, however, that certain supervisory functions will be retained by the U. N. over some aspects of life throughout Palestine. The shrines and holy places of Christianity, whether they be located in Israel, in Arab territory, or in some internationalized zone, will almost certainly be placed under international protection.

At present Israel is faced with the problem of advancing its cause in the United Nations while that body is being torn by the stresses of power politics. The Israeli feel that the U. N., in its truce orders, has equated aggressor with victim. They also have several important points of difference with Count Bernadotte's proposals, made by the mediator just before his assassination September 17, 1948. Bernadotte's recommendation that the large desert area of the Negeb be given to the Arabs in exchange for the small Galilee region is regarded by leaders of the new state

as a blow to Israel's capacity to absorb immigration and a contravention of the U.N.'s earlier partition plan. They also consider the recommendations for U.N. supervision of the Arab refugees within Israel's borders as an encroachment on their sovereignty.

RELATIONS WITH ARAB NEIGHBORS

Of almost equal importance is the question of Israel's relations with its immediate neighbors and with the great powers.

Foreign policy has, in our day, assumed a transcendent importance in the life of small countries; their very survival often depends on an ability to adjust themselves to the tremendous forces which cause international tension. This is particularly true of Israel, for the Jewish state was created in the face of bitter opposition from all the neighboring Arab states and from at least one great power, the United Kingdom. To bring about a reconciliation with the Arabs and with the British will, therefore, be an essential task of Jewish statesmanship.

A *rapprochement* with the surrounding Arab states is a prime imperative, a problem to which Israel will no doubt turn its immediate attention. David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, has repeatedly pledged friendship to Israel's Arab neighbors:

> Only by cooperation with our neighbors in the countries around us will we be able to consolidate the peace of our state. . . . We must exploit every opportunity to find a common language with the Arab peoples not on the strength of our victories, but on the basis of great opportunities which will arise from Semitic cooperation as free and sovereign peoples. . . . We will not miss any opportunity to contact the Arabs directly to achieve the great historic aim which will come from the cooperation of all Semitic peoples. . . .

In seeking such reconciliation, Israel will have to rely to a large extent, at least in the beginning, on its proven military prowess. Israel's superiority on the battlefield over the Arabs of five attack-

ing states will probably make the new Jewish state safe from renewed Arab attacks for a number of years, an interval which should be put to use to cement friendly relations with the Arab nations. For a while there may remain a certain rancour of defeat among the Arabs, especially in Transjordan and Egypt. The Arabs of Transjordan, aided by British money, material, and officers, are disappointed to find the conquest of the Israeli so costly and so difficult. The Egyptians, for their part, have objected because their original appropriations for the Palestine war of $120,000,000 did not suffice, and costs of the war have now risen to $360,000,000. The Egyptian government has a further complaint: last spring it expected that the war against Israel would be over in two weeks and that neither Britain nor the Security Council would intervene during that period. Quite the opposite has transpired.

The scars of defeat will not easily be healed. In the beginning therefore, these growing relations between Israeli and Arabs may be expected to be rather fragmentary in character and limited to the economic and cultural spheres. But if common aims and mutual advantage can be found in those spheres, it may not be too visionary to believe that, in time, Israel and its neighbors may forge close political links as well.

In the long run, the interests of all Middle Eastern countries are twofold: first, all seek economic progress, and secondly, all strive to safeguard their independence against direct or indirect encroachment by the great powers. Israel must inevitably share both objectives.

Once the Arab governments give up the idea of destroying the Jewish state, they can only gain by joining hands with Israel in a common pursuit of these two aims. If such an alliance should materialize, the stability of the Middle East would be greatly enhanced, since the neighboring countries of Israel could be counted upon gradually to acquire some of the Jews' technical knowledge, thus strengthening the entire Middle East for peace and human welfare.

Stability is, of course, not the only objective which men seek in

the world. Another objective is social progress. In this respect, the countries of the Middle East are particularly and notoriously deficient. Mass illiteracy, widespread disease, extreme poverty, primitive theocracy, unmitigated absolutism, and selfish feudalism are widely prevalent. To bring higher standards of living and a growing concept of democracy to the peoples of that area is desirable, even aside from the political connotations of such a change.

Today, there can be found in some countries in the Middle East the first stirring of discontent with the existing state of affairs. Progressive movements are growing in Middle Eastern countries. It is all too probable that this discontent, if held in check by the defenders of the old order, will break out in an extremist political and social revolution that can turn to either the Right or the Left. To some extent, at least, the existence of a modern and progressive Israel in the center of the Middle East may be expected to facilitate, by its example, the modernization and democratization of the entire area through a process of peaceful evolution and thus preserve it from the vicissitudes of revolutionary extremism. But the type of democracy Israel represents will be resented and held in disdain by those Arab nationalists who see no incongruity in the close relationship they cultivated during World War II with the Nazis.

RECONCILIATION WITH BRITAIN

Great Britain has impeded the development of the Jewish state, especially in these latter years. Yet, in spite of London's attitude and actions, Israel must seek reconciliation with Britain.

No longer the strongest, or even the second strongest, nation in the world, Britain nevertheless remains the great power most deeply involved in the Middle East and the one wielding most influence in that area. In addition, numerous economic links bind Britain to Israel. In the past Britain provided the principal market for two major Palestine exports, oranges and potash, and Israel would undoubtedly wish to resume this profitable relationship. About $400,000,000 of Palestine's deposits and currency reserves

are lying—at present frozen by order of the British Treasury—in British banks. The Haifa oil refinery and pipeline terminus represent British investments of considerable strategic and economic value on Israeli territory. Israel's proximity to the Suez Canal makes it a point of great importance in the Empire's life-line. Finally in its capacity as the most dynamic economic area in the Middle East, Israel is, in turn, important to Britain as a potential market for British exports.

To seek and find a *modus vivendi* with Britain remains, therefore, one of Israel's most important diplomatic tasks. In the very nature of things, Britain cannot remain indifferent to Israel. Unless and until Britain has been persuaded to cooperate in a friendly manner with the Jewish state, it is bound to regard Israel with hostility. The close relationship existing between Great Britain and the United States and the influence Britain exercises over American foreign policy makes it still more urgent for Israel to put in order its relations with the United Kingdom.

SAFEGUARDING NEUTRALITY

This task of reconciliation is further complicated by the need to safeguard Israel from becoming a puppet of one or another of the great powers.

The danger of becoming a puppet state is common today to most small countries. Some have already succumbed by persuasion, by economic inducements, or by brute force. Others are trying with greater or lesser success to avoid this fate. The situation of Israel is particularly delicate. Close kinship and economic bonds link Israel to five million Jews in the United States, to over half a million Jews in the British Commonwealth, and to about a million Jews in other Western countries. Equal kinship exists with some three million Jews in the Soviet sphere. The support Israel finds either in Washington or in Moscow is none too secure, and any move to identify itself with one bloc might easily cost it the support of one great power without securing the friendship of the other.

Finally, in common with many other small countries, Israel fears that a major war, even if fought on the winning side, might leave it prostrate and in ruins. Israel must therefore seek to avoid a war rather than to win one. It is true that the overwhelming majority of Israel's population is devoted to democracy in the Western sense of the word and that most of Israel's prospective immigrants from Eastern Europe seek to leave their countries precisely because communism does not appeal to them. Yet Israel's chief preoccupation will be to keep out of great power quarrels and to remain on correct and friendly terms with all nations.

When asked recently whether Israel plans to adopt a Western or an Eastern orientation, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion replied that Israel intends to adopt a United Nations orientation. Some leaders in Israel would go even further. Pointing to the traditional neutrality of Switzerland, a neutrality expressly or silently respected by all belligerents for well over a century, they believe it fitting that a similar status of perpetual neutrality be accorded to the Holy Land.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS

Vital as all these issues are, their solution will not avail the new state of Israel much if it does not succeed in solving its internal problems.

These internal problems are manifold. As in the case of every new state, Israel will have to devise and maintain a competent governmental organization. It must, moreover, devise a truly democratic system, integrate Jewish immigrants from many lands and with differing backgrounds into the melting pot of a renascent Hebrew civilization, provide true liberty and equality for its Christian and Moslem minorities, and avoid becoming a theocracy without falling into the pitfalls of excessive secularism. Some of these tasks were partly accomplished by the Jews in Palestine under the British regime. During the first months of Israel's existence, the new state, even though under fire, made further

progress in these directions. Without being unduly optimistic, one may conclude therefore that the Jews—with the political and social experience they accumulated in the West—will prove equal to the burden.

True to the historic pattern of nascent nations which have undergone revolution and war, Israel has it fringe of extremists and terrorists, mostly young people who have become unstrung and trigger-happy, unable to adjust themselves once more to peaceful conditions. The phenomenon, a familiar one, has been dealt with successfully in Ireland and in many other places. In view of the historic dislike of the Jews for violence of any kind, its eradication in Israel should present no special difficulties, especially after the wave of revulsion which swept Israel after the murder of Count Bernadotte by the Stern Gang.

ROOM FOR IMMIGRANTS

The principal internal problem facing Israel is, of course, the problem of immigration. To provide refuge for all those Jews who for one reason or another desire to settle in Palestine is the principal reason for the formation of the Jewish state. Had it not been for that, the Jews already in Palestine might have come to terms both with the Arabs and the British. But neither the Arabs nor the British would agree to the opening of Palestine for Jewish mass immigration, and on this issue the Zionists, mindful of the insecurity of Jews in Central Europe and the Moslem countries, could not compromise. The need to solve the problem of all those Jews—displaced or about to be displaced—who were in need of a country, was also one of the main reasons why the international community sanctioned the creation of a Jewish state. Finally, mass immigration of Jews is essential if Israel is to be strengthened and consolidated to the point of being less easily threatened.

This problem of mass immigration is, of course, inextricably linked with the opportunities for the economic absorption of the new immigrants. The task is truly gigantic. At the moment, the population of Israel, depending on the exact boundaries that will

be allotted to it, ranges between 850,000 and 1,000,000, of whom 700,000 to 800,000 are Jews. Should the future peace arrangement bring some of the Arabs who have left Israel to return to their former habitations, this would increase the population possibly by another one or two hundred thousand.

It is on this small population, less than 1,500,000 people at best, that the process of immigration seeks to graft a mass of newcomers whose exact number cannot be estimated but will probably be 1,500,000 at the least: about 200,000 Jews in the D. P. camps of Europe, about 700,000 other European Jews, some 600,000 Jews now living in Moslem countries, and about 100,000 Jews from other continents. Most of these immigrants will seek entry within the next decade, thereby doubling the country's population in the span of ten years. This is a truly great task.

Although the structure of Israel's government still is to be determined by a future constitution, its principal features can already be discerned. There will be a cabinet responsible to a central legislative body after the fashion of the parliamentary democracies of Britain and Western Europe.

The government of Israel will probably represent a coalition of several groups, of which the Leftist parties adhere, paradoxically, to a somewhat conservative pattern of thought and action, while the Rightists parties are revolutionary, at least in the intensity of their nationalism. The political parties crystallize into five major groupings: the two Socialist parties (Mapai of the Right wing and Mapam of the Left wing), the orthodox Mizrachi, the newly amalgamated Progressive Party (composed of three Center organizations), and the Freedom Movement, a political outgrowth of the Irgun Zvai Leumi underground. At a later time, one or two Arab parties will doubtless be added; one may represent the Moslems, and the other, the Christian Arabs.

Such a pattern of coalition, combined with a large element of compromise, may also be expected to characterize the economic structure of the country. The problem of settling in towns and rural areas large numbers of immigrants—currently arriving at the

rate of 15,000 a month—will dominate the new state's economy. The cooperatives, state enterprises, and communal settlements which are already much in evidence throughout the country will be further encouraged. At the same time Israel's development stands greatly in need of investment capital; private enterprise will therefore undoubtedly be given wide scope. The resultant mixed economy, where there is a co-existence side by side of capitalism and a voluntary form of socialism, will be reminiscent in many ways of the Swedish and British examples. On the other hand, communism, which seeks to eradicate private enterprise and to impose compulsory socialization, is very weak as an organized political party in Israel; unless Israel is rebuffed by the West and is compelled to turn to the East in self-defense, communism is not expected to grow stronger.

Relations between Jews and Arabs in the new state suffer, for the time being, from the effects of the war. But rudiments of the future relationship can be observed in those cities which have a mixed Jewish-Arab population such as Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias, and Safed, and in the purely Arab towns and villages. Civic and political equality is the basis of this relationship. In addition, an effort is being made to bring about economic equality by raising Arab living standards and wages. Within a wide area involving education, family relations, and religious rites, provision is made for the Arabs to continue, if they so wish, a cultural and legal pattern of their own based on Arab schools and on Moslem or Christian law. Special care is taken to insure religious freedom and municipal self-government, as evidenced in a series of measures already taken in the Nazareth area. As the atmosphere of war recedes, one may hope that this pattern will be increasingly developed.

Taken altogether, Israel's problems are many, perplexing, and challenging. Upon their successful solution rests not only the happiness and the security of the Jewish people but the future and the fate of the Middle East and perhaps even the peace of the world.

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The January issue

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by C. Lester Walker